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ABSTRACT
Dynamic Feature Extraction and User Classification
using TouchAnalytics™
Security systems for modern computing devices suffer from a multitude of weaknesses that can
render users helpless against an attack on their system. Various attempts at incorporating human
characteristics into security systems have achieved varying levels of success in improving security.
In this paper, we study the usefulness of TouchAnalytics™ - a second-level security system that
attempts to authenticate a user based on touch-data gathered from an interaction with the device.
Through the use of machine learning algorithms, we developed a system that is successful at au-
thenticating users, achieving under 0.05% False Authentication Rate (FAR). We conclude that the
removal of strictly defined training activities yields more characteristic data for each user, and thus,
a more accurate system.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
User - The individual training the learning algorithm.
Training Set - A set of data extracted from a user’s interaction with the device that our learning
algorithm uses to classify that user.
Feature - Specific characteristics within the training set that were extracted from the user’s in-
teraction with the device.
Qualifier - A training exercise created by the training program to be completed by the user.
Training Time - The time it took to train the learning algorithm.
Testing Time - The time it took to test every instance with the learning algorithm.
EER - Equal Error Rate
FPR - False Positive Rate
FAR - False Acceptance Rate
WEKA - WEKA is an open source program created bymachine learning program created by the
Machine Learning Group at the University of Waikato (www.weka.net.nz).
ARFF - Attribute-Relation File Format. This type of file is an ASCII text file that defines a num-
ber of instances that share common features. It is the default input file for the machine learning
algorithms in WEKA.
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Introduction
Companies have a difficult decision to make when implementing a security system for their
computing devices. As with most design decisions, choosing a technological security solution in-
volves analyzing a set of trade-offs. The most significant trade-off for security is cost and robustness
versus efficiency and ease of use. The security model most commonly implemented in today’s cor-
porate landscape chooses to sacrifice robustness to minimize cost. In this model, users are usually
presented with some basic method of authenticating themselves such as a password or PIN (Per-
sonal Identification Number). Upon a successful authentication, the user is granted access to the
system and all resources that have been granted to the user. This method of security, known as
entry-point authentication, is less cumbersome because it only requires one user interaction to au-
thenticate an entire session. Several problems arise when evaluating the reliability of this method.
To begin, entry-point based authentication methods are, in general, easily quantifiable by an at-
tacker. Attacks that plague the technology industry, such as brute forcing and phishing, are built
on this paradigm. Attackers are aware of the way that entry-point based passwords are structured,
such as a combination of alphanumeric characters for a password or the typical four digit passcode.
These forms, known as uni-dimensional because of the single feature being examined (eg. an array
of alphanumeric characters), are easily replicated. Almost any computer on the market can iterate
through hundreds of thousands or even millions of possible passcodes in only a few seconds.
In addition to this inherent flaw in entry-point based authenticationmethods, thesemethods rely
completely on users to determine the effectiveness of the method. These security methods are only
as good as the complexity of the passphrase used, andhumans are routinely lazy in theway that they
utilize security on their devices. This “human factor” is amajor detriment to the effectiveness of this
method, referred to as “the Achilles heel of information security” [1]. The interaction of humans
and security systems comprise many of the security problems in the technology industry [2]. In
one study concerning German and Israeli respondents, only 33% of users reported that they even
utilize the PIN security settings on their mobile devices [3]. Of those that do utilize these security
measures, 76% percent indicated that they never changed their PIN. Regarding the small group of
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users who do utilize passphrase based authentication methods, 70% percent of the Germans and
30% of the Israelis reported that they would be concerned for the data stored on their device if the
device was stolen.
On the other side of the spectrum, there are robust security methods known as biometric au-
thentication. Biometric authentication, in the broad sense of the word, attempts to identify a user
by their unchangeable human traits and characteristics. However, most purists limit the term to
mean facial recognition, iris scanning, or finger scanning applications. These security models are
known as multi-dimensional because they extract and examine multiple features of the dataset. For
instance, facial recognition software will not just look at the shape of the face. It might extract sev-
eral useful features about the face, such as the position of the eyes, the color of skin, and the size of
the nose. Biometric authentication systems require additional costs, such as the cost of the biomet-
ric capture hardware, the research of the system, user educational costs, and system maintenance
[4]. These factors add hundreds of dollars to the retail cost of any device, especially for laptops and
mobile devices. It should also be noted that most biometric authentication models are still the sub-
ject of a great amount of research. Most of the error incurred by the systems has to do with sensor
malfunction, such as poor lighting for facial recognition or dirt for finger scanning [4]. These errors
will be discussed further later in the paper.
Another major detriment of biometric authentication is its personal aspect, and the invasive na-
ture by which it operates. Biometric authentication demands an explicit interaction with the user,
collecting data that is highly sensitive and uniquely identifying. Public acceptance continues to
plague the advancement of biometric security in the technology sector as those implementations
that seem to be most effective are also the most permanent and the least publicly accepted [5]. Bio-
metric authentication’s dehumanization of the participant, the negative stigma relating biometrics
with criminal activity, and even rejection based on religious reasons are all cited as reasons to forgo
biometrics as a security model since it is so invasive. Following the recent disclosures of govern-
ment surveillance programs conducted by the National Security Agency, Americans are forced to
examine the inevitable harm that will come from the mass collection and storage of highly personal
data [6]. This revelation has led to an extreme distrust in any security model that collects sensitive
data, and demands reform of biometric security models that should not, by their very nature, make
us feel less secure.
TouchAnalytics™ attempts to combine the benefits of both types of security systems without
any of the detriments. The TouchAnalytics™ system is an entry-point based authentication sys-
tem that extracts features from a touch-based interaction and attempts to authenticate a user based
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on these features. Like entry-point based authentication methods, our proposed system is easy to
interact with and seems effortless to learn for new users. Because this system works underneath
systems already in place on touch-screen devices, no external hardware is needed. Thus, no extra
cost is passed onto the consumer. On the other hand, our system maintains all of the complexity of
biometric security systems. Unlike password based authentication, hackers cannot easily replicate
a user’s interaction with a device. Thus, the security of a device is increased greatly.
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Related Work
The system presented in this paper is similar to biometric authentication as defined in Jain et al.
[7], namely “the science of establishing the identity of an individual based on the physical, chemical
or behavioral attributes of the person.” The significance of biometrics in authentication is widely
documented, so they will not be discussed in depth for this paper. However, several overviews
of biometrics can be found in Wayman et al. [8], Faundez-Zanuy et al. [9], and Ross et al. [10].
The areas of biometric authentication that are most closely related are fingerprint analysis, hand
geometry analysis, keyboard stroke analysis, and signature analysis.
Fingerprint analysis is the use of images of a user’s fingerprints for authentication. Fingerprint
analysis is very accurate in ideal conditions, such as in Chen et al. [11], where the authors achieved
an Equal Error Rate (EER) of 1.94%. The success of fingerprint analysis in commercial applications
has been hindered by the lack of storage and computing power on a typical consumer device. For
instance, the authors of Clancy et al. [12] attempt to implement fingerprint analysis in a real world
scenario, but describe the difficulties of doing so. Through the implementation of fuzzy extractors
presented in Dodis et al. [13], the authors achieve an Equal Error Point (EEP) of 15% when imple-
menting a realistic model. Several approaches for storing fingerprint data in a practical manner
have been documented, such as Ratha et al. [14].
Similarly, hand geometry analysis examines features of a user’s hand, such as the location of
ridges and size of the hands. As with fingerprint recognition, this approach boasts very low EERs
within ideal conditions. For example, Sanchez-Reillo et al. [15] achieved a 97% correct classification
rate through the use of hand geometry feature extraction. In Kumar et al. [16], the authors achieve
a False Authentication Rate (FAR) of 5.29% and a EER of 8.34%. Keyboard stroke analysis is mainly
used as a complementarymethod to other biometric approaches, and a particularly large amount of
research seems to be geared towards classifying emotions based on keyboard stroke pattern recog-
nition in Tsihrintzis et al. [17, 18, 19] and Khanna et. al [20]. Using keyboard dynamic features
such as pressure applied, the duration of a key stroke and the latency of a key stroke, Shepherd
[21] reported favorable results for authenticating a user. The authors of this study report a correct
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classification rate of 92.14% using the keystroke dynamics previously listed to classify users. An
overview of keystroke dynamics can be found in Ilonen [22].
Lastly, signature analysis may be the most similar authentication method out of the previously
listed biometric authentication methods. The scientific and commercial significance of signature
recognition may be observed by the sheer amount of patents, such as Young et al. [23], Neti et
al. [24], Chmelar [25], Littau et al. [26], and Avni et al. [27], that exist for systems that classify
signatures. Parodi et al. [28] uses the Support Vector Machine and Random Forest algorithms to
achieve anminimum EER of 5.5% for online signature recognition. Notably, Jeon et al. [29] achieves
an EER of just 0.87% by examining images of users writing their signatures in the air. Signature
recognition has been proven to show promise as a primary means of authenticating a user.
In Shen et al. [30], a similar problem is approached: the classification of a user by analysis of
mouse dynamics on a computer. The authors cite a FAR of 0.55% and EER of 3.00% by the use of
ISOMAP manifold learning method. This study was comparable to the results in Pusara et al. [31],
which achieved a FAR of 1.75% and an average EER of 0.43% using features from a user’s mouse
movements. In Gianvecchio et al. [32], the authors collected 55 hours of game play activity data for
30 different users in the popular online game, World of Warcraft. By combining mouse dynamics
in conjunction with keyboard dynamics, the authors state “Our results show that the system can
detect over 99% of current game bots with no false positiveswithin aminute and the overhead of the
detection is negligible or minor in terms of induced network traffic, CPU, and memory cost.” Other
notable proposals for mouse dynamic based authentication techniques can be found in Gamboard
et al. [33], Jorgensen et al. [34], and Schulz [35]. A recent survey of significant findings in mouse
dynamic authentication can be found in Yampolskiy et al. [36].
The three papers that seem to bemost closely related to this work are Frank et al. [37], Sae-Bae et
al. [38], and De Luca et al. [39]. In Frank et al. [37], the authors examined the effects of continuous
authentication through touch feature extraction when the user scrolls through various Wikipedia
articles. The results for this experiment seem promising, citing from 15% down to between 2% and
3% EER depending on howmany strokes are used to train the system. However, the purpose of this
experiment is starkly different, in that we try to define how the qualities of structure, randomness,
and uniformity affect an entry-point based authentication system and exclude continuous authenti-
cation while scrolling. The authors of Sae-Bae et al. [38] discuss the feasability of gesture analysis to
identify a user. The authors are only concerned with a multi-touch approach to entry-point based
authentication on an iPad, achieving between 7%-15% EER. This paper diverges from their method-
ology in that it is only focused on a single-touch approach and analyzing the success of different
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types of activities. This paper attempts to fill a hole in the research done by Sae-Bae et al. [38], while
focusing mainly on the feasibility of non-structured entry-point authentication. Lastly, De Luca et
al. [39] may be the most closely related paper. The authors of this study simulated a traditional
Android lockscreen with a touch-based security system underneath. These authors cited 77% ac-
curacy, with a 21% false positive rate. However, in this study the authors used the dynamic time
warping algorithm (DTW) [40]. This paper differs in that we use machine learning algorithms to
classify users. In De Luca et al. [39], users were assigned a randomly generated passcode within a
structured activity for the entirety of the experiment. This is different from the primary goal of this
paper, which is to investigate the effectiveness of TouchAnalytics™ with no predefined structure
or passcode. We intend for our system to be completely anonymous to targets when performing
classification.
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Goals
Determining Usefulness of TouchAnalytics™
First and foremost, the usefulness of the TouchAnalytics™ authentication system must be as-
sessed both from an educational and a commercial viewpoint. Currently, the most common type
of entry-point based authentication system on the Android platform a is 3x3 matrix of dots that the
user must connect in a specified order to gain access to the system. The authentication system pre-
sented in this paper aims to add enhanced security by acting as a second level of security underneath
similar types of authentication systems that are already in place. While a comprehensive analysis
of the integration of this systemwithin a commercial infrastructure is not the focus of this paper, its
usefulness as a standalone application will be assessed. This will give a preliminary understanding
of the usefulness of touch-based authentication system in a commercial environment.
Evaluating Feature Importance
This paper attempts to develop an understanding of which touch-based features are most useful
to extract and analyzewhen attempting to classify an authenticated user. We predict that the useful-
ness of these extracted features will vary depending on the type of activity the user is performing.
However, one would assume that there are some features that are generally useful regardless of the
activity being completed. For instance, the area surrounding a user’s stroke (denoted Bounding-
Box-Area in this study) is much less insightful when a user is forced to interact with uniformly
located objects on the screen. In contrast, the size of the user’s finger (denoted Size-Average) should
be relatively constant throughout every interaction.
Comparing Activity Structure Layout
Lastly, we present three defining characteristics for the activities presented to the user for com-
pletion. This paper will attempt to define the contextual usefulness of each type of structure. This
usefulness is defined by many factors such as EER, FPR, Training Time, and Testing Time, which
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will be discussed in detail later. More importantly, we will attempt to identify the characteristics of
the structures that are most useful for each activity type when attempting to classify users.
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Experiment Methodology
Overview
A program was developed on the Android platform using the Java programming language to
collect data for the touch characteristics of a certain user. The Android platform was primarily cho-
sen because of its reliance on object-oriented programming and the ability to capture touch data
from the user easily. Users were prompted with the terms of service and the guidelines for exper-
imentation. These guidelines were intended to encourage, as closely as possible, input consistent
with the user’s normal interaction with the device outside of experimentation. The guidelines pre-
sented to the users included how to enroll, to complete each exercise at least five times, and approx-
imately how much time the entire experiment would take. Users were instructed that picking up
their finger indicated the completion of the training exercise and that in the event that targets were
presented to the user (such as dots to connect together), the user should only pass through each
target once. The importance of these rules will become more clear as we discuss each individual
training activity. These two special rules encouraged a homogeneous dataset and less “failed quali-
fiers”. A qualifier was considered failed if the user did not complete the instructions of the qualifier
or if a user accidently touched the screen before starting an activity. The user would complete each
qualifier the specificied number of times, and then the training for that user would be complete.
Figures 1 and 2 show the program layout and what a typical activity would look like.
After enrollment, the programwould present a user with different training exercises, henceforth
known as qualifiers, that required the completion of varying structures and instructions on how to
complete the activity. The structure and presentation order of these qualifiers were crafted accord-
ing to the characteristics defined in this paper. Although each user was instructed to complete each
qualifier five times, the user was allowed to complete any qualifier more than five times. Touch data
collected by this programwas then analyzed by the open source machine learning programWEKA
(www.weka.net.nz).
The number of users for this proof-of-concept study was restricted to 8 users because of the
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Figure 1: Program Layout
Figure 2: A Sample Input from the House Qualifier
nature of the problem being solved. Recall that the system presented operates under that condition
that a single user has trained it to authenticate themselves. An attack on the system would consist
of only one other unauthenticated user attempting to gain access to the system. A large amount of
users is excessive and would only provide noise to the system not present in a practical application
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since the ultimate goal is to collect a data set that is representative of the problem being solved.
However, to prevent over-fitting the data to the learning algorithms, we must include more than
two users. Therefore, the number of training exercises performed by each user was prioritized over
the number of users and the inclusion of more users has been left to further work, after the best
underlying structure has been determined.
Another important aspect of the usefulness of TouchAnalytics™ is it’s success rate over large
amounts of time. Admittedly, the time frame within which the users completed the experiment is
not homogeneous. Someuserswere only available to test for one session, while otherswere available
for multiple sessions several months apart. However, the goals of this paper do not address the
success of the system over time - we only seek to gain a preliminary understanding of the system’s
usefulness, as well as the most significant features and structures. Thus, the analysis of the system’s
success over time has been left to further work.
Qualifiers
Characteristics of a Qualifier
Ten total training exercises were grouped together in broad categories depending on their pur-
pose in the experiment. Before we can begin discussing the qualifiers used in this experiment, we
must first define the qualities used to create these broad categories. A complete understanding of
the systems can only be achieved by reading the entirety of this section and then referring to the
corresponding qualifiers descriptions in the following sections.
For our purposes, a qualifier is considered structured if that qualifier contains a recurring struc-
ture generated by the training program that the user must interact with to complete the exercise
(such as the rigid forms presented in the Honeycomb qualifier). Conversely, qualifiers that do not
contain a recurring structure are non-structured (such as the ’Circle qualifier, where the user is pre-
sented with a blank screen and no underlying structure to complete). A qualifier is considered ran-
dom if a qualifier is structured but the position of targets in that structure change. For example, the
Horizontal qualifier presents the user with the same structure of a horizontal line to complete, but
this qualifier randomly generates the position of the targets on the line. Conversely, a non-random
structure contains a rigid structure with the exact same form every time. The Honeycomb quali-
fier is considered non-random, because it presents the exact same structure to the user every time,
without any randomness of targets introduced. A qualifier is considered uniform if the qualifier is
not structured, but qualifier presents the exact same instructions to the user every time. A uniform
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qualifier routinely presents both the order and the form of the instructions in the same way. For
example in the House qualifier, the user is instructed to draw a house in the exact same order and
form for every training exercise. Non-uniform qualifiers, then, are those that introduce some ran-
domness of order or form in the presentation of instructions. For instance, the Random Sequence
qualifier (which presents five randomly selected instructions to the user) randomizes both order and
the form of the instructions. Note that random and uniform are mutually exclusive in this context,
being characteristics of only structured and non-structured qualifiers respectively. Guidance refers
to the overall concreteness of the exercise. Clearly, a structured/uniform qualifier would add more
guidance to the user. Inversely, introducing randomness causes a decrease in guidance. Table 1 lists
qualifiers from the most guidance to the least guidance, starting at the top. Users were instructed
to completed the qualifiers in this order so the effects of losing guidance could be examined.
General Qualifier Specific Qualifier Structured Random Uniform
Traditional Honeycomb Yes No -
Square Yes No -
Three Points Diagonal Yes Yes -
Horizontal Yes Yes -
Vertical Yes Yes -
Freestyle House No - Yes
Square No - Yes
Circle No - Yes
Gesture Random Sequence No - No
Connect the dots Random No - No
Table 1: Qualifier Grouping and Descriptions
Traditional Qualifiers
The Traditional qualifiers (Honeycomb and Square) are intended to ease the user into com-
pleting qualifiers by providing as much guidance as possible at the beginning. By presenting the
user with formations that are consistent but randomizing their targets (denoted by the blue dots)
within that structure, one can examine characteristics that could be applied underneath stereotypi-
cal lockscreens. Note that the targets within the structure were completely anonymous to the train-
ing data. That is to say, the intent of this general category is to examine if there are characteristics
that are unique without a set of target dots. In these qualifiers, a random number of dots (between
3 and 7) was selected to be targets, denoted by the blue dots. The structure of these targets varied
depending on which training activity was being completed. The user was instructed to connect the
dots in any order that felt natural. Red dots denote valid targets to move between the blue dots.
To move between dots, you must move to a neighboring dot - either vertically, horizontally, or di-
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agonally. However, the completion of all red dots was not required. Lifting the finger signified
completion of the qualifier.
• Honeycomb: The structure of the targets was in a honeycomb shape, as seen in Figure 3a.
• Square: The structure of the targets was in a square shape, as seen in Figure 3b.
(a) Honeycomb Qualifier (b) Square Qualifier
Figure 3: Traditional Qualifiers
Three Point Qualifiers
The Three Point qualifiers (Diagonal, Vertical, and Horizontal) signify the inclusion of random-
ness within a structured qualifier. By combining what we define as structure and randomness to
this qualifier, the user is presented with a structure that is reminicent of past completions of the
same qualifier, but are not exactly the same. This set of qualifier limits the amount of unique
characteristics that can be extracted. The purpose of this qualifier is only to examine the success
of TouchAnalytics™ within an extremely constrained environment and compare these to more
promising qualifiers, not as a method of authenticating users. The user was not instructed what
order to complete the dots. Lifting the finger signified completion of the qualifier.
• Horizontal: Three target dots, denoted by red dots, were positioned in a horizontal structure
with the position of the exact dots randomized, encouraging variation. An example is shown
in Figure 4b.
• Vertical: Three target dots, denoted by red dots, were positioned in a vertical structure with
the exact position of the dots randomized, encouraging variation. An example is shown in
Figure 4a.
• Diagonal: Three target dots, denoted by red dots, were positioned in a diagonal structure with
some randomized offset of the middle dot, encouraging increased curvature. An example is
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shown in Figure 4c.
(a) Vertical Qualifier (b) Horizontal Qualifier (c) Diagonal Qualifier
Figure 4: Three Point Qualifiers
Freestyle Qualifiers
The Freestyle qualifiers (House, Square, and Circle) indicate the divergence from structure while
retaining a uniform activity which executes the same way each time. By removing all structure
but allowing for repetition, one can see the characteristics which truly identify a user through sev-
eral iterations of a single action. Without giving the user any parameters as to how to complete
the qualifier, any number of variations could occur. The intent of this category is to examine the
uniquely identifying characteristics of a user in the least structured way possible. These qualifiers
were intended to remove all structure, but still retain some level guidance. No dots were provided
as targets. To improve consistency, the user was provided feedback about the starting point and a
trace was provided for this exercise. Lifting the finger signified completion of the qualifier.
• House: The user was instructed to draw a house on the blank screen, allowing for any variation
of orientation, shape, or size. An example of this qualifier is shown in Figure 5a.
• Square: The user was instructed to draw a square on the blank screen, allowing for any varia-
tion of orientation, shape, or size. An example of this qualifier is shown in Figure 3b.
• Circle: The user was instructed to draw a circle on the blank screen, allowing for any variation
of orientation, shape, or size. An example of this qualifier is shown in Figure 5c.
Gesture Qualifier
Random Sequence: The Random Sequence qualifier is the first to remove all guidance given to the
user, in so far as this experiment allows. The user is presented with five random actions, selected
from the following list:
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(a) Freestyle House Qualifier (b) Freestyle Square Qualifier (c) Freestyle Circle Qualifier
Figure 5: Freestyle Qualifiers
• “Swipe Left”
• “Swipe Right”
• “Swipe Up”
• “Swipe Down”
• “Swipe to top left!”
• “Swipe to top right!”
• “Draw a circle!”
• “Draw a square!”
• “Draw a smiley face!”
• “Swipe to bottom left!”
• “Draw an arrow to the
left!”
• “Write your name!”
The Random Sequence qualifier was intended remove both the structure and uniform factors
of the previous qualifiers. No familiar structure was provided to guide the user. Rather, the user
was given random instructions on the blank screen, allowing for any variation of orientation, shape,
or size of stroke. To improve consistency, the user was provided a trace of their strokes, as shown
in Figure 6. Each qualifier consisted of five instructions. This was the only qualifier where lifting
the finger did not signify the completion of a qualifier. The user is given no instruction on how
to complete this qualifier. The intent of this qualifier is to examine the core characteristics that
characterize a user by elimination removing the uniform aspect of the qualifier.
Figure 6: Random Sequence Qualifier
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Random Qualifier
Random Dots: The Random Dots qualifier (Random) was intended remove both the structure and
uniform factors of the previous qualifiers. No familiar structure was provided to guide the user.
Rather, dots designated as targets were randomly generated on the screen, encouraging variation.
The structure of these dots are show in Figure 7. The user was not instructedwhat order to complete
the dots. Lifting the finger signified completion of the qualifier. The intent of this qualifier is to
examine the core characteristics that characterize a user by removing the uniform aspect of the
qualifier.
Figure 7: Random Dots Qualifier
Data Collection
On the Android platform, there are only a finite number of features that can be collected about
a user’s touch. Because Android is an event-driven platform, data must be collected by processing
each TouchEvent as a separate entity. Although the processing of these individual TouchEvents
is not truly continuous, the process happens quickly enough for the application at hand to seem
continuous. The combination of the information gathered from these TouchEvent objects allows us
to construct ourmodel for a full user stroke. Table 2 shows how touch data was stored in each stroke
file. The description for each feature of the stroke is as follows:
1. Index: The position of the TouchEvent within the stroke. This is a placeholder which refer-
ences the first stroke since the qualifier activity was started.
2. X: The location of the touch applied in the X plane.
3. Y: The location of the touch applied in the X plane.
4. Size: The size of the finger recorded by the TouchEvent.
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5. Pressure: The pressure applied by the finger recorded by the TouchEvent stored as a normal-
ized coefficient.
6. Orientation: The orientation of the finger recorded by the TouchEvent stored as a normalized
coefficient.
7. Time stamp: Time in milliseconds that has passed since we started the qualifier.
Index X Y Size Pressure Orientation Time
0 1141 1146 0.011764707 0.44999998807907104 1.5707963705062866 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
n 1258 1113 0.0 0.47999998927116394 1.5707963705062866 1431
Table 2: Example of Data Collected to Form Each Stroke File
Data Processing and Simulation
As previously discussed, analysis was aided by the use of the various machine learning algo-
rithms in the open source program WEKA. Data files generated by the Android program written
for this studywere parsed to extract features from the touch data and stored as a single entry into an
ARFF (Attribute-Relation File Format) file for simulation. This is the default format for providing
input to WEKA’s learning algorithms.
Severalmachine learning algorithmswere tried before selecting the five thatwill be used through-
out this paper. Note that these machine learning algorithms were not chosen based on level of
success of the algorithms in this application. Rather, the selection of the best machine learning al-
gorithm has been left for further work. Instead, the algorithms chosen were selected because they
are widely accepted by the academic community, and they are representative of a broad set of ma-
chine learning algorithms. The algorithms chosen were Bayesian Network [41, 42], Naive Bayesian
Network [41, 43], Best-First Decision Tree [44], Logistic-Model Tree [45, 46], and the J48 algorithm
[47]. The theoretical analysis of these algorithms is not within the scope of this paper, but references
have been provided to familiarize the reader with them.
Unless otherwise specified, all simulations were processed using 10-fold cross validation over
10 iterations. Generally, the label, or the feature to be classified, will take a binary value indicating
that the user is the authenticated user or not. In a security context, this is really the only metric that
matters. For example, a TouchAnalytics™ secured lockscreen would only have to predict whether
you are the authenticated user or if you are anybody but the authenticated user. Several metrics
are important when discussing simulation results, but the most important is the false positive rate
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(FPR). While the correctly classified metric is an indicator of how consistent the algorithm is, the
false positive rate is the rate at which attackers are authenticated as the user. In an attempt to design
the TouchAnalytics™ model as robust as possible, both metrics will routinely be shown.
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Analysis
Determining the Usefulness of TouchAnalytics™
Before engaging in a discussion of themost useful features, it must be first shown that our system
is successful at authenticating a user. The results of our simulations confirm (and in many cases,
exceed) the high success rates cited in [37, 38, 39]. Table 3 shows the correct classification rate of
each qualifier for the different types of learning algorithms used in this paper. The best performing
qualifiers for each learning algorithm (bolded) suggest that there is a strong correlation between
the features examined in this study and their respective user. More important, however, is the FAR
metric shown in Table 4. Across 932 training instances, the TouchAnalytics™ system routinely pro-
duces FARs lower than 0.3%, the majority of which achieve a FAR of below 0.08%. Therefore, we
conclude that the TouchAnalytics™ system shows promise as a viable system for authenticating
users.
Dataset Instances BA NB BF J48 LMT
Traditional 256 74.74 71.88 74.65 77.20 81.94 
Honeycomb 146 74.61 74.12 74.39 76.92 80.00
Square 112 76.45 80.26 75.71 77.26 83.14
Three Point 266 77.23 66.52  83.17 84.71  84.07 
Horizontal 83 86.44 64.93  85.75 84.22 85.78
Vertical 70 80.71 84.29 84.00 84.43 88.29
Diagonal 113 82.35 77.16 82.76 82.30 90.48 
Freestyle 212 96.89 92.29  98.40 98.91 98.02
House 67 94.24 95.88 100.00 98.50 99.21
Square 77 94.64 92.13 90.79 92.04 94.68
Circle 68 96.50 98.26 98.52 96.93 96.93
Connect The Dots 156 89.38 91.74 88.05 89.44 92.85
Random 156 89.38 91.87 88.05 89.44 92.78
Gesture 40 97.50 92.50 99.00 97.50 97.50
Random Sequence 40 97.50 92.50 99.00 97.50 97.50
,  statistically significant improvement or degradation
Table 3: Accuracy of Every Qualifier
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Dataset BA NB BF J48 LMT
Traditional 0.27 0.33 0.17  0.17  0.10 
Honeycomb 0.25 0.30 0.18 0.17 0.14 
Square 0.17 0.23 0.14 0.14 0.10
Three Point 0.19 0.36  0.06  0.09  0.05 
Horizontal 0.02 0.34  0.03 0.08 0.03
Vertical 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.09 0.03
Diagonal 0.12 0.28  0.11 0.12 0.06
Freestyle 0.02 0.08  0.00 0.00 0.01
House 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01
Square 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02
Circle 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03
Connect The Dots 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.04 
Random 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.04 
Gesture 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Random Sequence 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
,  statistically significant improvement or degradation
Table 4: FAR for Every Qualifier
BA Bayes Net
NB Naive Bayes Net
BF Best-first Decision Tree
J48 j48 Decision Tree
LMT Logistic Model Tree
Table 5: Key for Tables 3 and 4
Feature Analysis
One of the major goals of this paper is to identify the features which are most characteristic
of people in various contexts using TouchAnalytics™. There are infinitely many ways to examine
the data, so this section’s scope will be restricted to usefulness of certain features in the context
categories presented in this paper. These contexts include all qualifiers, the structured qualifiers,
the random qualifiers, and the uniform qualifiers. Table 6 shows the abbreviated feature names
used in this paper and their descriptions.
Calculations including averages, max differences, and variances were computed to examine
which way of viewing each feature was most important. For instance, the average pressure applied
might be an important feature in characterizing an enrolled user. However, how a user’s pressure
varies may be useful as well. It is not unreasonable to think that some users will remain relatively
constant when applying pressure while others will vary greatly throughout each stroke. Equation
1 shows the equation used for computing variance where x is the average for the entire feature set
and  is the variance. Equation 2 shows the computation for max difference, denoted as.
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Name Description
Labels
User The user for the current qualifier
General-Qualifier The “General” category for the current qualifier
Specific-Qualifier The “Specific” category for the current qualifier
Stroke Features
X-Average Average X position
Y-Average Average Y position
Size-Average Average size of the finger
Size-Max-Difference Max absolute difference of the size of the finger
Size-Variance Variance of the size of the finger
Pressure-Average Average pressure applied by the finger
Pressure-Max-Difference Max difference of the pressure applied by the finger
Pressure-Variance Variance of the pressure applied by the finger
Orientation-Average Average orientation of the finger throughout the entire touch
Time-elapsed The amount of time in milliseconds taken to complete the stroke
Stop-X X coordinate where the stroke ended
Stop-Y Y coordinate where the stroke ended
Velocity-Average Average velocity of the stroke
Velocity-Max-Difference Max difference of the velocity of the stroke
Velocity-Variance Variance of the velocity of the stroke
Angle-Trajectory-Major Maximum angle between two points in the stroke
Average-Angle Average angle between two points in the stroke
Angle-Max-Difference Max angle between two points in the stroke
Angle-Variance Variance of the average angle between two points in the stroke
Delta-X-Bounding Distance traveled in the X plane
Delta-Y-Bounding Distance traveled in the Y plane
Bounding-Box-Area Area of rectangular bounding box that encompasses the stroke
Subset Features
Start-Dist-X-Percent Distance between the start position through the X% position
Stop-Dist-X-Percent Distance between the (100-X)% position the stop position
Start-Velocity-X-Percent Velocity between the start position through the X% position
Stop-Velocity-X-Percent Velocity between the (100-X)% position the stop position
Angle-Of-Trajectory-X-Percent Angle between the start position and the position at X%
Avg-Pressure-Start-X-Percent Average pressure between the start position through the X% position
Avg-Pressure-Stop-X-Percent Average pressure between the (100-X)% position the stop position
Table 6: Feature Descriptions (for the entire stroke)
 =
1
N
NX
i=1
(xi   x)2 (1)
 =
NX
i=1
max (xi   x) (2)
By executing a simulation including every single classifier (where there is no consistency in the
training exercise being performed), it is to be expected that a learning algorithm will not perform
very well. This training set includes a lot of noise introduced by the inconsistency of the qualifier
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data between users. However, one can examine this data to discover which features are the most
uniquely identifiable, regardless of the activity being performed. In Figures 8a and 8b, we can see
that although users are consistent, attributes about X and Y average positioning are not unique
to each user. Note that the X average position stays about the same while the average Y position
changes depending on the qualifier being executed. From this, it can be inferred that users will stay
consistent in the horizontal positioning, unless the activity prompts them to do so. Some qualities
that are very interesting are the average pressure applied (Figure 9a) and average finger size (Figure
9b), as they remain much more consistent throughout all exercises and vary significantly between
users. These features that are consistent for each user regardless of the qualifier being performed
are the most interesting features for classifying a user. Note that in these figures, the X-axis denotes
the value of the feature and the Y-axis denotes the user.
(a) Average X position (b) Average Y position
Figure 8: X and Y Position for selected users
(a) Average Pressure (b) Average Finger Size
Figure 9: Average Pressure and Average Finger Size for selected users
Table 7 contains the rankings of each feature dependent uponwhat category of qualifier is being
completed. The rankings calculated in this table were evaluated using the Significance Attribute
Evaluation [48] - a probability based feature selection algorithm focused on speed, accuracy, and
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precision of the results. Each simulation was conducted with 10-fold cross validation, ensuring the
most accurate analysis of the features. For each category of qualifier, the top five features have been
highlighted in green. The next five best performing algorithms have been highlighted orange.
All Structured Non-Structured Random Non-Random Uniform Non-Uniform
Size-Average 1 1 1 1.2 1 1.4 1
Size-Max-Difference 2.4 3 3.9 5.4 3.7 5.5 3.5
Orientation-Average 3 2 3.2 3.1 5.8 9.4 3.4
Pressure-Average 3.6 4.1 2 6.7 4.9 7.2 2.1
Pressure-Variance 5 4.9 9.6 6.1 7.1 15.8 6.3
Pressure-Max-Difference 6 6.3 8.6 9 10.8 12.7 6.7
Delta-Y-Bounding 7.7 10.1 11.7 13.5 14.5 11.1 13
Bounding-Box-Area 8.2 8.5 7 4.9 12 4.5 8
Size-Variance 10.2 11.1 13.9 11.5 9 3.6 11
Stop-Y 10.6 12.9 6.7 17.5 19.2 1.6 16
Y-Average 10.7 9.6 13.9 10.3 9.9 14.2 10
Time-elapsed 11.5 6.8 14.6 4.8 8.8 18.1 9
Stop-X 12.6 12.1 15.4 12.5 13 13 12
Delta-X-Bounding 15 14.3 13.3 9.1 16 7.5 15
Velocity-Average 15.1 16.8 5.7 21 2.3 13 5
Angle-Variance 15.7 14.2 18.4 15 17 13.3 14
Angle-Max-Difference 16 17 13.2 17 15 13.1 17
Average-Angle 17.7 17.7 19.6 16.5 18 10 18
Velocity-Max-Difference 19.1 20.9 18.6 20 19.7 19.6 21
Angle-Trajectory-Major 19.4 17.8 20.6 18.5 20 17.6 19
Velocity-Variance 20.5 19.9 10.1 7.4 3.3 18.8 20
X-Average 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
Table 7: Ranking of Features Using Significance Attribute Evaluation
Overview
Clearly, several features are important and consistent across all qualifiers. Our results show that
Size-Average, Size-Max-Difference, Orientation-Average, Pressure-Average, Pressure-Variance, and
Pressure-Max-Difference are particularly characteristic of users across all different types of quali-
fiers. This is consistent withwhat youwould expect, as features such as pressure and finger sizewill
remain consistent regardless of what type of qualifier is being completed. Note that for each feature
set concerning the physical properties of the users finger (pressure, orientation, size), the “average”
component of these feature sets consistently outperform both the max distance and variance. This
is expected, as pressure variance is harder to reproduce than an average pressure, which converges
over multiple strokes. Because these features are important in nearly every case and their signifi-
cance as features is obvious for every qualifier, they will not be discussed in the following analysis
unless they are particularly significant.
Some features, such as Time-elapsed, Delta-X-Bounding, Velocity-Average, andVelocity-Variance,
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appear to have some significance to characterizing a userwithin a particular type of qualifier but not
overall. Again, these features exhibit behavior as expected - the Time-elapsed feature is not useful
when attempting to characterize the user across all qualifiers because they require vastly different
amounts of time to complete. However, it becomes a very important feature when characterizing
a user in a specific type of qualifier, which requires a much more consistent time frame. These
features will be discussed in depth in the following sections.
Lastly, we can see that there are several features that are not important for any type of qual-
ifier. Such features include X-Average, Angle-Trajectory-Major, Velocity-Max-Difference, Angle-
Max-Difference, Angle-Variance, Stop-X, and several other features for specific types of qualifiers.
We conclude that these features are not very important to classification because they are too general
to be categorized across many different qualifiers. For this reason, discussion of these features in
the following sections will be omitted from analysis.
Structured vs. Non-Structured Qualifiers
For the structured qualifiers, the Time-elapsed feature seems to be characteristic because of the
uniformity of the qualifiers being presented to the user. In the case of the Honeycomb qualifier, a
user will allow a relatively similar amount of time to elapse for the stroke since the activity is so
similar each time. What is interesting about the rank of this feature is the fact that this feature does
not take into account how many targets were presented to the user. In this case, you would think
that the time elapsed would increase with the amount of targets presented. Clearly this is not the
case. This suggests that each user will complete the structured activities in a consistent amount of
time, regardless of the number of targets presented.
Conversely, the Velocity-Variance and Velocity-Average features are extremely characteristic of
users within the context of non-structured qualifiers. Stop-Y and Bounding-Box-Area are also much
more important when characterizing the user for non-structured qualifiers. The reason for this is
that in non-structured qualifiers, the user is left to complete the activity in anyway they choose. This
allows the user to a have much more characteristic interaction for the spatial features previously
discussed. For instance, the House qualifier allows for a user to draw a house in any way or of any
size they choose. Because the user is not confined by some structure they must complete, these
spatial features will vary greatly between users. Thus, they will be highly characteristic.
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Random vs. Non-Random Qualifiers
For the random qualifiers, the previously important feature set involving pressure becomes
slightly less important for determining users. Because the random/non-random qualifiers are chil-
dren of the structured qualifiers, much of the analysis regarding structured qualifiers is relevant
here. One unexpectedly important feature is the Bounding-Box-Area, which is the fifth most im-
portant feature for this section. In these qualifiers, the system introduces randomness by dictating
targets which the user must interact with. One would assume that the spatial features such as the
bounding box area are insignificant in these qualifiers. It is important to note that many spatial fea-
tures are not significant. Why then is the bounding box area so characteristic of users? We predict
that this is the case because the bounding box is proportional to the displacement in both the X
and Y planes. While neither of those attributes (Delta-X-Bounding and Delta-Y-Bounding respec-
tively) are very significant, the compounded effect of the two is. Take for instance the Horizontal
dots qualifier. In this case, the Delta-X-Bounding feature will be relatively similar for all users,
since they are generated randomly by the testing program. What is not inherent for this qualifier
is the Delta-Y-Bounding feature. Some users may deviate largely in the Y plane, while others have
almost no variation in the Y-plane. When these two features are multiplied together to compute
Bounding-Box-Area, the difference of values are largely dependent on the user’s Delta-Y-Bounding
component. The opposite is true in the Vertical qualifier, where the user’s Delta-X-Bounding feature
will largely determine the difference in Bounding-Box-Area values.
Similarly, the features that are important in the structured qualifiers are important in the non-
random qualifiers. Two attributes that have increased greatly in performance are the Velocity-
Average and Velocity-Variance features. Because the non-random qualifiers are structured, one
would assume from theprevious analysis that spatial features such asVelocity-Average andVelocity-
Variance are not very characteristic. We believe that the reason that the velocity is so characteris-
tic is because of the nature of the non-random qualifiers. Navigating the Honeycomb and Tradi-
tion Square qualifiers requires agile finger movements among randomly generated targets within
these structures. The required completion of this structure eliminates many of the spatial features.
However, velocity becomes increasingly more important because it requires calculated interaction
among targets in a close space. Somepeople carefully navigate through each target suggesting lower
velocity in their strokes, while others process the target locations carefully before they begin their
stroke and navigate speedily among them. For this reason, velocity features are highly characteristic
of this type of qualifier.
Clay McLeod, CONFIDENTIAL © 2014 - Page xxx of xlii
Uniform vs. Non-uniform Qualifiers
The uniform qualifiers are notable because the most important overall features are least rele-
vant within this type of qualifier. Instead, features such as Bounding-Box-Area, Size-Variance, and
Stop-Y are significant when characterizing a user in this context. Note that in this type of qualifier,
every feature concerning size is highly relevant to classification. Because the uniform qualifiers are
children of the non-structured qualifiers, much of the analysis concerning non-structured qualifiers
is relevant to this discussion. For instance, the spatial feature sets are significantly more important,
while the pressure features become less important. The uniformqualifiers allow for themost charac-
teristic spatial interaction with the qualifier throughout the entire experiment. Therefore, attributes
such as Bounding-Box-Area and Stop-Y are dictated completely by the user.
Lastly, the non-uniform qualifiers rely heavily on the Velocity-Average feature for the same rea-
sons discussed in the analysis of the non-random qualifiers. The user must interact with the targets
randomly generated by the program. Some users will carefully select each target while others will
complete the qualifier in the quickest way possible. However, in this case there is no recurring
structure presented to the user. Therefore, the velocity is not quite as important in the non-uniform
qualifiers as in the non-random qualifiers, because the user does not have to be as calculated in
navigating a structure.
Features Involving Subsets of the Curve
By examining ratios of characteristics within an individual’s stroke, one would imagine you
could add some classification value. For instance, some individuals might begin their stroke with
a high velocity and as they approach their landing point, their velocity decreases rapidly. In op-
position, another user might apply pressure at both the start and finishing point of their stroke,
indicating some special characteristic activity around these points. Our simulations indicate that
in the structured qualifiers these subset features are characteristic, while they generally only add
noise in the non-structured qualifiers. Table 8 contains the change in correct classification rate for
the training data including subsets for 15%, 50%, and 85% of the stroke.
Structure Analysis
The results conclude that the best performing qualifiers are the non-structured, uniform qual-
ifiers represented by the Freestyle subset of qualifiers. For every learning algorithm, the Freestyle
qualifiers are either the best or very close to the best performing qualifier. This is because in the
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Dataset Instances BA NB BF J48 LMT
Traditional 256 3.45 0.7 3.33 2.64 1.94
Honeycomb 146 4.49 2.01 4.18 7.54 0.73
Square 112 0.66 4.19 2.31 1.44 -0.27
Three Point 266 6.91 9.42 1.11 1.01 5.22
Horizontal 83 0 13.5 -0.17 -2.55 1.22
Vertical 70 8.43 5.28 1 0 -1
Diagonal 113 7.32 8.73 -0.06 2.5 0.96
Freestyle 212 -2.11 -1.1 -1.09 -1.03 -0.33
House 67 2.83 1.64 0 0 0.31
Square 77 -9.35 -6.18 0.57 1.66 0.14
Circle 68 -0.69 -2.33 0 0 -0.41
Connect The Dots 156 -4.51 2.23 0.38 -0.31 -0.06
Random 156 -4.51 2.23 0.38 -0.31 -0.06
Gesture 40 0 0 0 0 0
Random Sequence 40 0 0 0 0 0
Table 8: Change in % of CCR (including subset data for 15%, 50%, and 85%)
Freestyle qualifiers, the user is freed from all constraints placed by the training program. The
Freestyle qualifiers are the least “guided” qualifiers that contain repetition. Therefore, these quali-
fiers allow for the most characteristic activity by the user. One particularly interesting fact is that for
almost every algorithm (excluding the Naive Bayes Net algorithm), the Freestyle class of qualifiers
performs better when training with the entire dataset, not the individual House, Square, or Circle
datasets.
Note that the non-uniform qualifiers also perform well individually. However, the non-uniform
qualifiers do not perform well as a grouped set. By definition, the non-uniform qualifiers are not
consistent among training exercises. When the Random Dots and the Random Sequence qualifiers
are combined together, there is not enough consistency among the two qualifiers to create a unique
feature set for each user. In the best performing simulation, the non-uniform dataset achieved only
90.6% correctly classified rate. Therefore, the uniform qualifiers are clearly the best performing
qualifiers tested. Figures 10, 11, and 12 show the performance rates of each type of qualifier.
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Figure 10: Structured vs. Non-Structured Qualifiers
Figure 11: Random vs. Non-Random Qualifiers
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Figure 12: Uniform vs. Non-uniform Qualifiers
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Further Work
To claim that TouchAnalytics™would be able to be implemented as a commercial system, much
more research must been done on the specifics of integration underneath current security systems.
Most of these systems are highly confidential, presumably to keep attackers from gaining insight on
how to break the system. In place of this in-depth analysis, it would suffice to look at the prominent
patents filed by major technology companies. This would provide sufficient information to decide
whether TouchAnalytics™ could be implemented in a commercial environment.
In this paper, the machine learning algorithms were not chosen based on level of success of the
algorithms in this specific application. Rather, the algorithms chosenwere selected because they are
widely accepted by the academic community, and they are representative of a broad set of machine
learning algorithms. The determination for the algorithm most suited for this application would
require a significant discussion of the types of machine learning algorithms and extensive testing.
Also left to further work was the level of success of the systemwith more users and across larger
amounts of time. As previously discussed, the conditions involving these two factors in this exper-
iment were designed to maximize efficiency with regards to the current problem being discussed.
This does not imply that testing with more users and across large amounts of time is not crucial to
the commercial application of TouchAnalytics™. Because of the significance of these factors, further
work will be conducted to determine their affects on the system.
Lastly, much more future work must be done to consider the practical implementation of the
TouchAnalytics™ system in a corporate environment. For instance, one question examined might
bewhat the EER iswhen allowing some users to attempt authentication a finite number times before
determining they are an attacker. We predict that the inclusion of this featurewould greatly increase
the viability of this system. Other notable areas of inquiry include how the system works when the
user is allowed to create their own activity to authenticate. The success of the unstructured qualifiers
in this paper suggests that such a system might perform extremely well, as the user is allowed to
exercise all possible features that could uniquely identify them. In this way, we predict the level of
success of that application to be reliant on the complexity of the user’s authentication activity. Just as
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“password” is an easily guessed password, a single swipewould be an easily reproduced gesture by
an imposter. Therefore, future experimentation will be comprised of the following method. Several
users will be tested using the same program written to test users for this paper. In each training
exercise, the user will be required to draw a design of their choosing ten times. After every user has
enrolled themselves, users will continue to test the system over longer periods of time. During these
testing sequences, a userwill be shownboth the figure that he or she drew for a short amount of time.
The user will then be asked to recreate that structure to authenticate themselves. In addition to this
task, the user will be shown another user’s design and asked to attempt to draw it. From this testing,
we will be able to get an idea of the success of TouchAnalytics™ in a commercial environment.
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Conclusion
Feature recognition through the use of TouchAnalytics™ seeks to combine the benefits of both
security approaches while retaining none of the detriments. This multi-dimensional approach to
both entry-point and continuous authentication applications will serve as a highly effective second
level of security. Typical security attacks such as brute forcing will not work because the features
described are not easily quantified or iterated through. TouchAnalytics™ effectively eliminates the
human factor by adding multiple complexities seamlessly underneath systems that are familiar to
users and that are not considered invasive. On the other hand, TouchAnalytics™ eliminates the
need to interact with external biometric capture hardware, eliminating the large cost incurred by
the end-user. The data collected is clearly much more anonymous and less invasive in the lives
of its users. Computations do not involve high performance systems like some other biometric
authentication algorithms, so data can be stored completely locally rather than uploaded to a server
for computation. These factors contribute greatly the viability of TouchAnalytics™ in a commercial
setting.
In terms of its accuracy in classification, our results show that TouchAnalytics™ is a viablemeans
of second-level authentication. Through simulation of 932 training instances we achieved a 100%
correct classification rate and 0% FPR for our best performing qualifier, outperforming the results
presented in [37, 38, 39]. While this result is probably not reproducible in a real world setting,
the majority of the non-structured qualifiers achieved over 97.5% correctly classified rate with less
than 0.03% FPR. Through these simulations, we conclude that a non-structured uniform qualifier
is the best performing qualifier tested in this experiment. Therefore, we conclude that the use of
TouchAnalytics™ with a non-structured uniform qualifier would perform well as a second-level
authentication system.
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